Annual Parr|Bioethics Joint Lecturer
Director of Early-Career Research, Center for Human Values
Professor, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy and the University Center for Human Values
Princeton University
Elizabeth Harman is a professor at Princeton University in the Department of Philosophy and the Center for Human Values. She serves as Director of Early-Career Research at the Center for Human Values, where she provides career development and placement support to graduate student fellows and postdoctoral researchers. She also edits Insights: Short Works of Philosophy, a book series published by Princeton University Press.
Together with Elisabeth Camp and Jill North, she co-founded and organizes the Athena in Action Networking and Mentoring Workshops for Graduate Student Women in Philosophy; the sixth workshop took place at the University of Notre Dame.
Her current book project, When To Be a Hero, explores actions that go above and beyond what morality strictly requires. She argues that some of these actions are such that we ought to perform them—so failing to do so would constitute a moral mistake, even though it would not be morally wrong. Recognizing that there are things we should do for moral reasons that are not morally required, and that morally permissible moral mistakes exist, sheds light on important aspects of our moral lives—a theme she develops in the book and in a series of recent papers.
Zoom Webinar
Passcode:056864
Selected Publications
“Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes,” Ethics, 2016. (Abstract)
“Morality Within the Realm of the Morally Permissible,” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, 2015. (Abstract)
“Eating Meat as a Morally Permissible Moral Mistake,” in Philosophy Comes to Dinner, in Philosophy Comes to Dinner, Andrew Chignell, Terence Cuneo, and Matt Halteman, eds., Routledge, 2015. (Abstract)
“Gamete Donation as a Laudable Moral Mistake,” in Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics, Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell, and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns, eds., Oxford, forthcoming. (Abstract)
“There is No Moral Ought and No Prudential Ought,” in Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason, Ruth Change and Kurt Sylvan, eds. Routledge, 2021. (Abstract)
To learn more about our speaker, please visit her website: elizabethharman.org.
Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of the presenter, they do not necessarily reflect the views of the contracted organization, department, School of Medicine, nor the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.